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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COuh;?. Y OF ALBANY

In The Matter of CHRIS BRATHWAITE,
Petit i.mer,
-againstHENRY LEMONS, JR., As the Acting
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of the New York State Board and
Division of Parole,,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-09-ST0114 Index No. i 638-09
Appearances :

Chris Brathwaite
Inmate No. 9 1-A- 1 176
Petitioner, Pro Se
Hudson Correctional Facility
East Court Street
Box 576
Hudson. NY 12534-0576
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Aaron M. Baldwin,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDEFUJUDGMEXT

The petitioner, an inmate at Hudson Correctional F3c.1lily, has commenced the instant
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CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated May 5,2008 to
deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of four to twelve
years for the crime of robbery. second degree and fifteen years to life for the crime of
murder, second degree. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition. petitioner
contends: (1) that the Parole Board‘s determination is so arbitrary and capricious that it
violated fundamental due process and lawful procedure; (2) that the Parole Board violated
its statutory mandate by not fully and fairly examining

2.5

of the available and relevant

information; (3) that it failed to provide an adequate and memingful statement of the reasons
for its determination; and (4) that he was denied due procex and equal protection of the law
because a Commission sitting on the Board was not qualified.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to dmy petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Parole is again denied after a review ol’ the record and
interview. The panel has determined that your release at this
time would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to
undermine respect for the law.

“You continue to serve time for killing a victim during the
course of a robbery. Only a rew weeks later you again robbed
another victim. Both of these victims were altempting to use an
ATM machine at a bank when approached by you and your
codefendants. The first victim was left to dic in a pool of blood
after being shot in the neck.
“The Board notes your program and educational
accomplishments as well as your letters of support.
“More compelling, however, is the brutal and violent murder of
nn unprovokcd victim and your cnllousncss ir! robbing n second
victim afer committing such a heinous crime. Your crimes show
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a disregard for the welfare of society.

"As such, your release at this time is inappropriate."

As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):

"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released. he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's
representative [I" (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, it' made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis. 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept..
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,
200 11). If the parole board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the board's determination is not sub-ject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part

of the Pr?roleBoard has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (E
3

Matter of Silmon
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v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional prograinining and education, his disciplinary record, and
his plans upon release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the
reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i
(-see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825

[3rd Dept.. 19941; L ~ U C L01. cIi.cdl1 i.~

L L '1
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i

199 AD2d 677

[3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the
seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (E Matter of Weir v. New York
W?te
~Pkb.iw nf P ~ - d e205
. AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New

York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d
863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (seeMatter of Farid v Travis,
239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept.,
19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor
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Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence
of Executive Law
Dept., 20061).

5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd

In other words. “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable

weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning the alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (E Greenholtz v Inmates
nf the YTthriql;2 P:n:il

2nd CnrrPrtinn21 C‘rmplx, 442 US 1 7 [1979]; Matter

nf

Riynv

New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73. supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law cj 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Bama v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord. 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v
1121nrmd:, 6n5 F2d 661, CC.? [2d Cir., 197?]; l‘zuidtd v T.J,~,I
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1368 [SD NY. 198 11; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69.75-76,
supra. Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept.. 20051: Matter of Lozada v
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept.. 20071). The Court,
accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With respect to petitioner's equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment
ofthe Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within theirjurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable
classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 45 1 US 648,68

L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [ 19811). Where the action under review does not involve
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal
protection clause (E,

Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Muraia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d

520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New
York, 274 F3d 740,75 1 [2ndCir., 20011). In addition, because "New York courts addressing

a state equal protection claim will ordinarily afford the same breadth of coverage conferred
by federal courts under the US Constitution in the same or similar matters" (Brown v State
of New York. 45 AD3d 15, 20-21 [2007 [3rdDept., 20071. quoting Brown v State of New
York, 9 AD3d 23, 27 [2004]). the Court discerns no violation of NY Const art 1 5 11. The
P ~ i i r find:
t

the argument to have no i x r i t .
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Petitioner's contentions concerning Commissioner Arena's qualifications do not
operate to undermine her lawful authority as a duly appointed Parole Coininissioner under
Executive Law

5 2594, and do not demonstrate an infringement of either his due process

rights or his right to equal protection under the law.
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall comtitiite the deciqinn order 2nd judynerlt of the Coiirt. The orizinal
decision/order(judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
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ENTER

/a

Dated:

,2009
September
Trov. New York
,

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

I

Papers Considered:
1.

2.

Order To Show Cause dated March 1 1,2009, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated May 12,2009, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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